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EDITOR'S OBSERVATIONS 
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Professor and Associate Dean for Research, Marquette Law School 
Editor, Federal Sentencing Reporter 
Author, Life Sentences 8/og 
In a single month sixteen years ago, April 1996, Congress adopted sweeping changes to two major 
branches of what we might refer to as the law of prisoner litigation. First, in the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act, Congress imposed many significant new limitations on the ability of 
prisoners to challenge the constitutionality of their convictions and sentences through federal habeas 
corpus law. Then, in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Congress similarly restricted the ability of 
prisoners to obtain monetary and injunctive relief in federal court for violations of their constitu-
tional rights perpetrated by corrections officials. The two statutes worked major changes to habeas 
corpus and prisoner-rights litigation that remain with us to the present day. 
Whatever one may think about the underlying impulse to curtail prisoner litigation, the adoption of 
the AEDPA and PLRA hardly exemplifies Congress at its best. Although both laws responded to long-
standing conservative complaints about prisoner litigation, the specific new restrictions on habeas and 
prisoner-rights lawsuits were adopted hurriedly in an election-year setting, embedded within larger 
statutes and subject to little rigorous vetting.1 Anecdotes drove the congressional debate. 2 Drafters 
seemed oblivious to much of the preexisting law on prisoner litigation, creating many redundancies 
and gaps in the law, as well as repeatedly using terms with no established meaning. Sixteen years on, 
sorting out the PLRA and AEDPA messes remains a regular feature of the Supreme Court's docket. 
As a result oflong-running de bates over the meaning of key aspects of the P LRA and AE D P A, the 
legacy of the statutes has been something of a moving target. Although it was clear from the start 
that the statutes of'96 were intended to, and did in fact, make it harder for prisoners to advance con-
stitutional claims in federal court, it was much less clear precisely how much harder it would become 
to prevail on which sorts of claims and to obtain which sorts of relief. 
Now, however, with sixteen years of case law and scholarly research behind us, it seems a good 
time to reconsider both the legacy of the PLRA and AEDPA and the path forward. 
This issue of FSR thus examines the present state and potential future reform of prisoner-litigation 
law, particularly in light of the PLRA and AEDPA experience. The contributors consider a diverse 
range of specific provisions of the two statutes, as well as a host of more general concerns. Although 
there is much more that could be said about the many insights provided by the contributors, I will in 
this introductory essay focus on just four major themes that run through many of the articles. 
Framed as questions, they are: (r) whether the PLRA and AEDPA reflect systemic failures of the 
democratic process as it relates to prisoner-litigation law; (2) whether the courts have mitigated the 
inherent problems of the statutes; (3) whether it is time to look beyond the federal courts as the pri-
mary safeguard against violations of defendants' and prisoners' rights; and (4) whether the arcane 
and arbitrary litigation processes engendered by the PLRA and AEDPA should be thought of as 
punishment in their own right. 
I. The PLRA and AEDPA as Systemic Failure 
The PLRA and AEDPA both constitute multipronged attacks on the ability of prisoners to secure relief 
from federal courts for claimed violations of their constitutional rights. Among other things, the PLRA 
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imposed a mandatory requirement that prisoners exhaust administrative remedies before suing in fed-
eral court, limited money damages to cases of physical injury, required that even indigent inmates pay 
filing fees, capped attorney's fees, and limited the potential scope of injunctive relief. For its part;, the 
AEDPA imposed a new one-year statute oflimitations for the filing ofhabeas claims, tightened restric-
tions on the filing of multiple petitions, mandated heightened deference to state-court decisions on the 
merits, and limited the ability of petitioners to rely on facts that were not developed in state court. 
Although the '96 statutes emerged from a particular confluence of political forces at a particular 
moment in time, we might nonetheless see them as reflecting deeper flaws in our democratic pro-
cesses or political culture- flaws that systematically impair the ability of Congress to address 
prisoner litigation in a manner that fairly takes into account the rights and interests of prisoners. To 
the extent that this charge hits the mark, it may have implications for the role of the courts in review-
ing and implementing the statutes, as well as the utility of efforts by reformers to seek repeal of some 
of the harshest provisions of the laws. 
Susan Herman suggests some of the basic concerns in her contribution to this issue: "Prisoners, 
who are usually deprived of the right to vote, do not have much of a lobby. Politicians vie to attract 
votes by appearing to be 'tough on crime' (which they assume means being tough on prisoners)."3 In 
a similar vein, James Robertson notes that no inmates testified before Congress about the potential 
impact of the PLRA.4 As Sharon Dolovich suggests, prisoners seem just the sort of "discrete and 
insular" minority that, as the Supreme Court on<:e warned, requires heightened judicial protection 
from legislative oppression.S Given their lack of political power, prisoners seem poorly positioned to 
resist becoming the target of symbolic legislation through which politicians can express their disap-
proval of crime and criminals. 
In light of these dynamics, it is not surprising that Congress, when considering prisoner-litiga-
tion reforms, would tend to credit claims that most prisoner litigation is frivolous and to adopt 
measures that restrict the availability of relief. In this sense, it may be fair to view the PLRA and 
AEDPA as reflecting systemic failures in the democratic process. 
Interestingly, though, there does :q.ot seem anything inevitable about prisoner litigati_on rising to 
the top of the legislative agenda. Congress has not repeatedly restricted habeas and prisoner rights, 
the way that it has, for instance, repeatedly adopt~d new mandatory minimum sentencing laws. Per-
haps this is because the substantive rights at issue are constitutional, meaning that Congress's role is 
largely limited to questions of process-questions that are less likely to excite the public imagination 
than are questions bearing more directly on penal severity. Process questions are of greatest interest 
to system insiders-judges, lawyers, corrections officials-and insiders won't be inclined to think 
about legal change in purely symbolic terms; it is they who have to bear the transaction costs of figur-
ing out and implementing a new regime. After all of the litigation spawned by the PLRA and AEDP A, 
we might understand why insiders have not demanded additional waves of prisoner-litigation reform 
since 1996. 
There may be parallels with Congress's failure thus far to respond to the Supreme Court's 2005 
decision in United States v. Booker, which transformed the federal sentencing guidelines from man-
datory to advisory.6 The question of whether the guidelines range should be binding (absent legally 
sufficient grounds for departure) or advisory (but with a presumption of reasonableness during 
appellate review) is a quintessential insiders' question. Although Congress did engage with the 
"bindingness" of the guidelines in the 2003 PROTECT Act,7 it should not be surprising that Con-
gress has declined to return to such an arcane topic since then, especially now that the insiders have 
invested considerable effort in filling in Booker's many gaps. 
The PROTECT Act also has other interesting parallels with the AEDPA: both statutes were 
adopted hurriedly, with important but obscure changes to insiders' law linked to unrelated measures 
with broad~political appeal and unstoppable legislative momentum, in the one case addressing ter-
rorism and in the other child abduction and abuse. Whether there are common causal forces behind 
such seemingly random collisions between the political system and the law of criminal procedure is 
not clear. Nor is it clear whether one should find it reassuring that Congress mostly seems to leave 
insiders' law in this area alone, but does swoop in at irregular intervals to adopt ill-considered 
reforms. 
But perhaps there are some post-1996 developments that make it less likely that prisoner-litiga-
tion law will be made a vehicle for expressing distaste for criminals. For instance, the innocence 
movement was still in its infancy in the mid-r99os; a wave of high-profile exonerations since then 
may diminish enthusiasm for further restricting access to post-conviction remedies. More generally, 
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reduced crime rates since the mid-1990s seem to have lessened the political salience of crime. The 
death penalty, too, has been in sharp decline since the mid-199os8; to the extent that capital punish-
ment loses its salience, so, too, will one of the most important arguments against habeas-that is, 
that habeas endlessly delays executions. Additionally, groups such as Human Rights Watch have 
done a great deal since 1996 to raise public awareness of prison rape; passage of the Prison Rape 
Elimination Act in 2003 demonstrated the success of their efforts and revealed a surprising level of 
concern in the political system regarding at least one aspect of prison conditions. Finally, the suc-
cessful advocacy for the Fair Sentencing Act of 2oro by groups like Families Against Mandatory 
Minimums suggests that prisoners and their supporters may no longer be quite so politically power-
less as was once the case. Indeed, developments such as these may even offer some glimmer ofhope 
for the many thoughtful reforms proposed by this issue's contributors. 
II. Courts as Corrective Forces for Flawed Prisoner-Litigation Statutes · lJ. .. .. -
If one takes the view that the PLRA and AEDPA imposed arbitrary and unjustified limitations on 
the ability of prisoners to obtain redress for constitutional violations, then one might wonder if 
the courts have tended to mitigate or exacerbate the problems with the statutes. After all, the 
PLRA and AEDPA had more than their share of ambiguities, which, as a practical matter, left the 
courts with considerable power to determine the ultimate harshness of the new prisoner-litigation 
regime. 
The courts' track record has been mixed. For instance, in her contribution to this issue, Eliza-
beth Alexander argues that the "particular plaintiffs" provision of the PLRA could have had a 
large, negative impact on the scope of injunctive relief available to prisoners and their ability to 
have class actions certified; however, the courts have eschewed expansive interpretations of this 
provision.9 Likewise, Sharon Dolovich discusses a pair of recent Supreme Court decisions that 
declined to interpret other PLRA restrictions broadly.ro And, for her part, Giovanna Shay notes a 
number oflower-court decisions that have recognized exceptions to the PLRA's exhaustion 
requirement. n 
On the other side of the PLRA ledger, though, Michael Mushlin argues that the courts have inter-
preted the statute's "physical injury" requirement in a more restrictive fashion than necessary, 
thereby precluding relief in several cases in which prisoners' constitutional rights were violated in 
particularly outrageous ways.rz 
As to the AEDP A, Larry Yackle argues that it is actually the Supreme Court, and not Congress, 
that deserves the lion's share of the blame for the "colossal mess that federal habeas corpus has 
become."I3 He points in particular to two interpretive tendencies. First, the Court has "typically 
focused on the text of AEDPA provisions without sufficient attention to the policy implications."I4 
Second, the Court "insisted that every AED P A provision, in turn, had to be read to alter habeas law in 
some way (usually to the disadvantage of habeas petitioners)."rs Yackle suggests that this interpretive 
strategy is "inapt" because the Court had adopted a number of important changes to habeas law in 
the years leading up to 1996, and there is "no reason to think that anyone in Congress meant those 
changes to be adjusted."r6 
Nancy King's contribution suggests that AEDPA has indeed had an impact. Based on a compre-
hensive analysis of 2,188 noncapital habeas cases filed in 2003 and 2004, King finds a grant rate of 
just o.8 percent, as compared with a one percent rate prior to AEDP A.I7 Of course, this 20 percent 
reduction in the grant rate inay be due at least in part to other factors (e.g., changes in the composi-
tion of the federal judiciary), but it is hard not to think that AED PAis playing a role. 
Why have the courts not more consistently adopted narrow interpretations of the PLRA and 
AEDPA? After all, it is their jurisdiction that is being squeezed. Part of the explanation probably lies 
in a principled commitment to the sorts of textualist interpretive strategies that Yackle describes. 
Additionally, one imagines that some judges are not overfond of this particular corner of their juris-
diction, dominated as it is by prose litigants who, even pre-1996, were only very rarely able to put 
together a meritorious claim for relief. Then, too, notwithstanding its formal political insulation, 
there is no reason to think that the federal judiciary is entirely free from the public attitudes toward 
crime and criminals that have so marked our political discourse; the judges are, of course, ultimately 
products of the political system. 
Whatever the explanation, the evidence suggests that the courts have not by any means systemati-
cally mitigated the harshness of the prisoner-litigation reforms, and, in fact, may have at times 
created greater harshness than was plainly mandated by the statutes. 
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Ill. Alternatives to the Federal Courts 
Historically, the federal courts have played a crucial role in responding to systemic abuses in state 
criminal-justice and corrections systems. Although the sort of overt racism that once particularly 
warranted federal judicial intervention now seems a thing of the past, problems undoubtedly remain. 
But is it wise to continue to regard the federal courts as the primary agent of redress and reform, or 
is it time now to look elsewhere for leadership? After all, the post-1996 judicial track record dis-
cussed above does suggest a certain ambivalence in the federal system regarding prisoner litigation. 
What about the state courts, for instance? In his contribution, Daniel O'Brien argues that large 
improvements in the quality of state post-conviction processes between the late r96os and the mid-
1990s significantly diminished the need for federal habeas review.r8 With more robust forms of 
collateral review now available, it is possible to imagine state courts playing a more active and effec-
tive role in addressing wrongful convictions and misconduct by police and prosecutors. 
In their contribution, however, Lynn Adelman and Jon Deitrich sound a warning note, emphasiz-
ing that judges in most states are electorally accountable.r9 Although we may have moved beyond the 
heyday of tough-on-crime politics, Adelman and Deitrich note much evidence suggesting that these 
political dynamics may still play an important role in judicial elections, and hence judicial behavior-
perhaps even a growing role in light of the increasing amount of money and negative advertising in 
judicial elections. 
Eric Freedman suggests a middle ground of sorts.20 He sees a critical role for state courts in the 
post-conviction process, but also calls on federal courts to ensure that state criminal defendants really 
are given at least one full and fair opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of their convictions. 
He also calls on states to provide for effective assistance of counsel in the post-conviction process. 
This would surely be a helpful complement to the other sorts of advances noted by O'Brien. 
Other contributors look beyond the judiciary entirely for leadership. Joseph Hoffmann focuses on 
the need to address innocence claims effectively, but notes that the courts are not well-positioned to 
perform screening and investigation roles for such claims.zr He lauds the emergence of private ini-
tiatives, such as the Innocence Project, that have increasingly played a pivotal role in screening and 
investigating innocence claims. He also finds much promise in public initiatives such as the North 
Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, an independent state agency that reviews and investigates 
assertions of wrongful conviction. Hoffmann observes, "Actors situated outside the judicial system-
whether private or public- are structurally better positioned to screen and investigate post-conviction 
innocence claims than are the courts, if for no other reason than that they do not suffer from the 
same inherent conflict of interest. Courts have an inherent interest in the affirmation of judgments 
- rendered by courts."22 
Michele Deitch also finds a number of inherent weaknesses in the role of judges as overseers of 
prison conditiorts. 2 3 For one thing, the substantive constitutional standards are so low that courts 
cannot even begin to address many serious deficier.1cies in the correctional system. For another, the 
lawyer- and expert-intensive judicial oversight model is too expensive, especially at a time when cor-
rections budgets are already stretched far too thin. In light of these and other considerations, Deitch 
urges states to create independent prison oversight agencies, which would conduct regular inspec-
tions of all institutions and issue findings and recommendations publicly. To be sure, she sees a 
continuing role for courts as a "fail-safe protector of prisoners' rights," and urges repeal of the PLRA 
so that courts may play this role more effectively.2 4 Yet she also sees a potential unexpected benefit 
from the PLRA to the extent that it may spur reformers to consider alternatives to the judicial model 
of oversight.2 5 Perhaps the AEDPA has had, or could have, a similar benefit in spurring non-judicial 
initiatives in the area of post-conviction review. 
IV. Pro~_ess as Punishment 
The '96 s atutes were largely couched as efforts to reduce the burdens imposed by prisoner litigation 
on federal courts and state governments, but it may be no less apt to think of the statutes as increas-
ing the severity of punishment. Indeed, at one level, this point may seem self-evident. After all, the 
AEDPA's very title ("effective death penalty") reveals that it was in some sense a sentencing statute-
Congress intended to facilitate the imposition of our nation's most severe punishment. And it also 
seems obvious that the diminished accountability of prison officials under the PLRA would lead to 
harsher conditions of incarceration for many inmates. 
But I mean to suggest here a different sense in which the new procedural requirements are 
punitive- in which they are a punishment in their own right. Malcom Feeley famously observed 
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years ago that legal process could constitute punishmenV6 but this point may have a unique 
valence in the context of post-1996 prisoner litigation. Long before Feeley even, Kafka showed us 
that subjecting a person to an arbitrary and opaque legal process may be profoundly dehumanizing .. 
And, in some respects, contemporary prisoner litigation does have a distinctly Kafkaesque character. 
As Larry Yackle puts it, habeas litigation has become a "nightmare," "delivering unjust and 
bizarre results even in the run of ordinary cases, and, at best, squandering resources on endless and 
pointless procedural digressions." 27 Nancy King's detailed accounting ofhabeas grants from 2003 
and 2004 seems to capture some of this flavor. She doesn't find any pattern in the cases; "they 
appear to be a random assortment of errors affecting a wide variety of proceedings."28 The proce-
dural history of many of these cases is of mind-numbing complexity, dragging out over many years. 
And- in a truly Kafkaesque irony-at least three of the eighteen "winners" obtained no benefit from 
the victory, with one actually receiving a much longer sentence for his troubles. Only four of the win-
ners secured immediate release from prison, while proceedings continue· to drag on for ~o of the 
remainder- now approaching a decade after the filing of their habeas petitions. 
On the prisoner-rights side, David Fathi's contribution evocatively describes the emergence of a 
"separate but unequal system of court access that applies only to prisoners." 2 9 Fathi's phrase sug-
gests an analogy to the system of "separate but equal" that stigmatized African-Americans in the Jim 
Crow South. 
But it may be James Robertson's effort to describe what the PLRA looks like from the perspective 
of a "punk" (a sexually abused inmate) that most powerfully <o:aptures the nightmarish quality of the 
statute, particularly its creation of arbitrary barriers to legal redress that seem almost willfully blind 
to the realities of prison life.3° Robertson suggests that prison rape is a de facto part of court-imposed 
sentences ofincarcerationY Perhaps the PLRA and AEDPA should also be regarded as a de facto 
part of the punishment. 
A large body of procedural justice research teaches that the process through which a legal deci-
sion is made may matter as much, or even more, to the people affected by a decision than the content 
of the decisionY In particular, a legal process that treats participants with dignity and respect may 
promote respect for the law and legal system, even if the substance of the decision is adverse. With 
increasing attention being paid to the challenges of prisoner reentry,33 it is unfortunate that our pris-
oner-litigation processes now seem so ill-designed to promote positive attitudes toward the law. 
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